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ABSTRACT 
Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V 
Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this 
is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of small vessels operating in 
proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants, 
and to passenger and military ships. In this study, small boat effectiveness in the 
interception of attacking speedboats is analyzed using the stochastic, time-stepped, agent-
based simulation tool MANA. Three alternative defender tactics of scramble from base, 
barrier patrol, and random patrol are explored against two possible attacker modus 
operandi of saturation attack and diversionary attack. The probability of at least one 
attacker reaching the defended asset is the primary measure of effectiveness. A full 
factorial experiment was designed and executed for defenders tasked to protect the Port 
of Los Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. The findings indicate that the defenders are 
highly susceptible to diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their 
effectiveness can be improved by retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a 
potential follow on attack. The study highlights the limits on patrol boat effectiveness to 
intercept small high-speed vessels which lead to the nullification of any numerical 
advantage the defender may have when faced with a saturation attack. Anticipating the 
heading of the attacker is a critical factor for a successful engagement. 
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Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V 
Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this 
is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of small vessels operating in 
proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants, 
and to passenger and military ships.  
According to an analysis spanning four ports (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008), an 
intelligent enemy executing an attack using explosives-laden speed-boats, who is able to 
observe the defense and choose an attack route to maximize the probability of evasion, 
can be detected with near certainty. Through the application of an attacker-defender bi-
level optimization mixed integer program, the author recommended the pre-positioning 
of patrol boats to achieve a near 100% probability of detecting an approaching small 
vessel, but noted that the interception of the attackers may not have been possible with 
the proposed positions as interception was not an objective of his model. In addition, 
since Abdul-Ghaffar was essentially stationing picket boats to provide best sensor 
coverage, he suggests his solutions need augmentation through future research on the 
solution for best intercept tactics. Operationally, these tactics imply mobile patrol sectors 
located near expected threat axes or choke points vice stationary picket locations.  
This thesis expands on Abdul-Ghaffar’s prior research, illustrating the use of 
modeling and simulation to analyze the robustness of the recommended deployment 
profile in interdicting the threat. The effectiveness of three alternative defender tactics 
(scramble from base, barrier patrol, and random patrol) are explored against two possible 
attacker modus operandi of saturation attack and diversionary attack using the stochastic, 
time-stepped, agent-based simulation tool MANA. The primary measure of effectiveness 
is the probability of at least one attacker reaching the defended asset. A full factorial 
experimental design was conducted for defenders tasked to protect the Port of Los 
Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. 
 xiv
The analysis raised several key issues concerning the interception operation: 
 Defenders are highly susceptible to diversionary attacks: Regardless of 
defenders’ tactics, if a decoy boat manages to divert the attention of the 
defenders, the real attacker would be able to slip through and deliver a nasty 
blow to the defended asset. The defender must be prepared for the likelihood 
that the attacker will employ a diversionary tactic by retaining sufficient 
defensive assets for a potential follow on attack. 
 Patrol boat effectiveness is limited: Weapons fired from a moving platform 
may not hit their mark due to the instability of the moving platform, coupled 
with the fact that both the patrol boat and attacker are maneuvering, limiting 
the effectiveness of the patrol boat in stopping an attacking small vessel. In 
addition, the cloud of confusion that can arise in the melee when defenders 
give chase to multiple attackers could lead to one or more attackers getting 
through to the defended asset. 
 Saturation attack nullifies defenders’ numerical advantage: Due to the 
limited effectiveness of the patrol boats described above, the defenders’ 
numerical advantage may not be realized when facing multiple attackers, 
particularly if the attack is concentrated along a single axis. 
 Anticipating the attacker’s heading is a critical to successful engagement: 
In this study, the defenders are able to anticipate where the attackers will head 
toward since the defended assets are confined to a small geographical 
location. The defenders will be disadvantaged if the defended assets stretch 
over a long coastline. 
 
This research demonstrates the use of modeling and simulation to facilitate 
understanding the interception of small boat attacks using several possible defensive 
tactics, and has spotlighted key limitations in the defense. The complexity of the problem 
calls for further research on aspects of interception operations not studied in this thesis, 
such as to understand the factors pertinent to the defense of assets spread over a longer 
coastline, or to assess alternative platforms and weapons for more effective mitigation of 
the small boat attack threat. 
 xv
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines small vessels as: 
 Any watercraft, regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross 
tons (GT). Small vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, or any 
other commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyage…. Although 
there is no exact correlation between a vessel’s length and its gross 
tonnage, a vessel of 300 GT is approximately 100 feet in length. (DHS 
Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), 2008, p. i) 
Nearly a decade after the attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and the M/V 
Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen, attacks involving small vessels remain an extant maritime 
threat, especially when small vessels are “readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by 
terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, aliens, and other 
contraband, and other criminals” (DHS SVSS, 2008, p. i). 
The same report quoted that there are “nearly 13 million registered U.S. 
recreational vessels, 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial small  
vessels” (p. 9) operating in U.S. waters, and “perhaps another 4 million unregistered 
recreational boats” (p. 9). The ease of a threat camouflaged in the midst of numerous 
small vessels, compounded by the high frequency of small vessels operating in proximity 
to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants, and to 
passenger and military ships, make small vessels a continuing security concern. 
According to an analysis spanning four ports (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008), an 
intelligent enemy executing an attack using explosives-laden speed-boats, who is able to 
observe the defense and adjust accordingly, can be detected with near certainty, but the 
author noted that the interception of the attackers may not have been possible. Of course, 
if an attack has been detected, it is imperative to intercept and stop the attack. 
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B. RESEARCH DIRECTION 
With the interest from DHS in addressing the threat from small vessels and a gap 
of understanding concerning interception, this research is guided by the following goals: 
1. Analyze the effectiveness of previously recommended patrol boat 
locations (by Abdul-Ghaffar, previously optimized for surveillance) in an 
interception operation. 
2. Exploratory analysis of alternative defender tactics against a variety of 
attacker tactics to obtain insights into the interception operation, with 
regards to: 
a. Optimal strategies to employ defender assets, and 
b. Possible weaknesses the attacker can exploit. 
 
C. THESIS FLOW 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II paints a backdrop by detailing the 
prior analysis that was performed by Abdul-Ghaffar. An in-depth discussion is made on 
the operational implications of the findings and the link to the motivation of this study. 
Chapter III surveys the expected operational environment, relates current security 
strategies and a precise threat definition, and translates attackers’ and defenders’ concept 
of operations (CONOPS) into the simulation model. Chapter IV presents a detailed 
discussion of the results and relates the simulation results back to the real world. Chapter 
V concludes the analysis with operational insights and compares the simulation 
methodology used to Abdul-Ghaffar’s attacker-defender model, with a proposal of topics 
for further research.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
A. PRIOR ANALYSIS 
Abdul-Ghaffar (2008) developed a planning tool that recommends the positions of 
SAFE Defender-class patrol boats as surveillance picket ships to detect determined 
adversaries attacking known high-value assets in ports with small boats. Due to the 
accessibility of the ports to the public, the attackers were deemed to have the capability to 
obtain “prior knowledge of the defensive disposition” (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008, p. xvii). His 
objective was to achieve an “optimal pre-positioning of defender surveillance pickets to 
protect high-value assets to minimize the maximum probability that intelligent attackers, 
observing our surveillance positions, can evade us” (p. 57). He successfully showed that 
“in every instance… alert defenders with existing radar can detect attacker raids with 
near 100% probability via their optimal pre-positioning. This is due to the restricted 
navigational access channels to ports” (p. 57). However, he conceded that the 
interception of a detected attack may not be possible “due to the relative speeds of the 
defending pickets and the attacker craft” (p. xviii). In addition, the intercept geometry 
between the attacking boats and the defender platforms, whose positions were optimized 
for detection, may not have been optimal for interception. 
B. MODEL OVERVIEW 
Using the probability that an attack will be detected as a Measure of 
Effectiveness, Abdul-Ghaffar modeled the terrain of a port as a mesh network (see Figure 
1), where nodes represent square cells of 0.15 nautical miles (NM) by 0.15NM, and edges 




Figure 1.   Network Representation of Port Terrain (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008) 
The attacker’s goal was to choose an attack route to minimize the probability of 
being detected, being able to exploit weaknesses in the defense through the prior 
observation of defensive preparations. The defender’s task was to position defender 
patrol boats, which function as surveillance platforms, so as to collectively “minimize the 
maximum probability of evasion by the attackers” (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008, p. 17).  
The probability of detection was modeled using the radar range equation (Skolnik, 
2002), taking into consideration obstacles that may obstruct the line of sight between the 
patrol boats and the attackers. The problem was then formulated as an attacker-defender 
bi-level optimization mixed integer program, and subsequently decomposed and solved 
as a capacitated network flow linear program using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS, 2008). 
 
 5
C.  VARIABLES AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The defender platform considered was SAFE Boats International’s Defender class 
patrol boat, a standard boat in the United States Coast Guard (USCG, 2010), while the 
attacker was assumed to use a Baja 20’ Outlaw class speedboat (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Technical Specifications of Baja Outlaw and SAFE Defender (Abdul-
Ghaffar) 
D. RESULTS OF THE PRIOR ANALYSIS 
Abdul-Ghaffar analyzed four ports, namely the Port of Los Angeles (LA), the Port 
of Hong Kong (HK), Al-Basra oil terminal in Iraq, and the US 5th Fleet Headquarters in 
Bahrain. The number of attackers ranged between one and four, with the ports defended 
by either two or four defenders. Figures 3 through 6 show some of Abdul-Ghaffar’s 
recommended deployments of the patrol boats, all of which achieved a 100% rate of 
detecting the intruder. The patrol boats in some scenarios appear co-located, while in  
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other scenarios, the attackers are observed to choose similar attack routes. The 

























Figure 6.   4 Defenders Against 2 Attackers in HK (After Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008) 
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E.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
Adul-Ghaffar’s objective was to station patrol boats as floating radar picket 
stations to best detect small vessels while at the same time solving for the best way for 
threat vessels to approach their target given they know the location of the patrol boats.  
 He stresses in his conclusions the need to also solve for locating patrol boats for 
interception. A patrol boat is typically tasked to patrol a sector and performs inspections 
of ships or shore facilities. In addition, establishing patrol sectors as near as possible to 
the threat axis or in restricted approach lanes would be considered a prudent tactic to 
enhance the opportunity for interception. Thus, alternative defensive deployment tactics 
for patrol boats to be mobile and operate over a larger region will be explored in this 
thesis, vice stationary solutions for Abdul-Ghaffar’s picket boats optimized for detection. 
An observation on Abdul-Ghaffar’s results were multiple attackers selecting the 
same route (to minimize the detection probability in a bid to evade the defender), 
suggesting the employment of a saturation attack tactic. Furthermore, it is plausible that 
the attacker may choose an alternative deception tactic by diverting the defenders’ 
attention before committing the actual attack. Such variations in attacker tactics could be 
a concern when stationing patrol boats for intercept, and are explored in this thesis. 
F. DEEPER DISCUSSION 
1.  Deployment Position 
In an attempt to replicate Abdul-Ghaffar’s results, the LA scenario was re-run, 
and a new optimal deployment was recommended and reproduced in Figure 7. The 
defenders are now stationed along the path of the attackers, different from the positions 
that Abdul-Ghaffar had showed previously. This deployment also yields a 100% 
probability of detection, an indication that more than one optimal (or near optimal) 







Figure 7.   A Re-run of Abdul-Ghaffar’s LA Model for 2 Defenders Against 2 
Attackers Showing an Alternative Recommended Deployment for the Patrol 
Boats 
2.  Probability of Detection 
The effective radar horizon (Skolnik, 2002, summarized in Figure 8) of the SAFE 
Defender was found to be 6 nautical miles (NM) for a radar at a height of 6 feet to detect 
a target 6 feet tall, significantly smaller than the radar range of 36 NM used by Abdul-
Ghaffar, and could explain the high probabilities of detection shown in his results. 
 
Where:
d: Radar Horizon in Nautical Miles
ha: Antenna Height
ht: Target Height  
Figure 8.   Radar Horizon Calculation (in Nautical Miles) 
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With the range of the radar being significantly larger than the area of operations, 
which is 5 NM wide, Abdul-Ghaffar’s cell-to-cell probability of detection of the attacker 
by the defender’s radar was found to be very high (almost 98% probability per cell), such 
that just two cell-to-cell transitions would yield a high probability of detection of 0.999 
(see Figure 9). In effect, as long as the defenders are placed with an unobstructed line of 
sight to the entrance, there would be a near 100% probability of detection, even for a 
single defender, explaining Abdul-Ghaffar’s results of high probability of detection of the 









Figure 9.   Detection Probabilities upon Cell Transition 
G. MOTIVATION 
Precipitated by an agreement with Abdul-Ghaffar’s proposition that the 
interception of detected small speed-boats with a speed advantage poses “a vexing 
defense problem” (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008, p. xviii), and that in reality, there is a possibility 
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that the attackers and defenders may choose to employ alternative tactics, a need to study 
the issue of interception of small vessels in greater detail arose.  
Detection without interdiction would have negligible impact on actually 
preventing such a terrorist attack, so this study aims to seek operational insights for 
defense against small boat attacks by exploring the effectiveness of a range of defensive 
tactics in interdicting a variety of small boat attack tactics.  
Compared to mathematical models, simulation models typically require minimal 
assumptions about the nature of the problem. MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata, 2007) is a simulation tool for scenario exploration that has been previously 
employed to study the maritime protection of critical infrastructure assets (Tiburcio, 
2005) and naval tactics in an island complex (Lalis, 2007). MANA is a stochastic, time-
stepped, agent-based distillation with a quick set-up time and modeling flexibility, having 
pre-built components to model tactics and simple behaviors such as following waypoints, 
acting on situational awareness, and avoiding the enemy. Simulation through MANA is 
chosen to allow more realism in analyzing the engagement between the patrol boats and 
the attacking speedboats. 
The two Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) driving the analysis are: 
1. Probability of attacker success, where a success is defined as at least one 
attacker reaching the defended asset, and  
2. Number of attackers killed.  
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 13
III. DETAILED SCENARIO AND MODELING  
A. SCENARIO AND MAPS 
1. Current Security Strategies to Determine Intent 
The difficulty of tracking small vessels was vocalized in the DHS Small Vessel 
Security Strategy:   
Small vessels may easily blend or disappear into other vessel traffic in 
ports and the coastal maritime environment, and are usually subject to less 
scrutiny than larger vessels in these areas. They are often inconspicuous, 
fast, highly maneuverable, and able to quickly relocate via roads and 
surface transportation…. (DHS SVSS, 2008, p. 12) 
While tracking a small vessel is challenging, it is even more difficult to identify a 
vessel driven by terrorists with malicious intent among a plethora of innocent boats. Port 
authorities have implemented varying measures to address these concerns, and facilitate 
the identification of suspicious vessel behavior. 
In the Port of Los Angeles, Controlled Navigation Areas (CNAs) are special 
zones that prohibit the general boating public and allow only select vessels to approach, 
“enabling the Port Police to quickly identify vessels that represent anomalies and 
therefore possible threats to the port” (Port of Los Angeles, 2010, see Figure 10). 
Unauthorized vessels that approach the CNAs draw immediate attention to themselves, 





Figure 10.   Controlled Navigation Areas (Port of Los Angeles) 
In the Port of Hong Kong, traffic control measures such as traffic separation 
schemes and speed restrictions exist (see Figure 11). For the purpose of comparison in 
this study, a security measure is applied on the port, such that only cargo vessels 
approaching the terminal are allowed to use channel A. Small vessels, such as the 
attacker speedboats modeled in this study, that deviate from the traffic lane are deemed 
suspicious and will be investigated. 
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Figure 11.   Traffic Separation Scheme in the Port of Hong Kong (Port of Hong Kong 
Development Council, after Microsoft Word) 
Many major ports perform active surveillance of their waterways via coastal radar 
and waterside cameras to monitor traffic and prevent ship-to-ship collisions. These assets 
can also be used to watch for vessels not adhering to the exclusion zones and traffic 
separation schemes, enabling detection of anomalous behavior of vessels that could 
possibly indicate malicious intent. Together with the security strategies discussed above, 
active surveillance is able to build up situational awareness, and this study assumes it will 
be possible to deduce and identify small vessels that are exhibiting anomalous behavior. 
In order to determine if the anomalies are malicious, patrol boats will be alerted to 
intercept and investigate the flagged anomalous vessels. 
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B. THREAT DEFINITION 
1. Possible Attacker Modus Operandi 
The attacker is intelligent, and will plan to use a range of tactics in a bid to 
overcome the defense: 
1. Saturation attack: Being able to observe the defender, the attacker plots 
an attack using numerical superiority to overwhelm the defense. 
2. Diversionary attack:  One attacker deliberately behaves in a way to 
attract the defender’s attention (could be entering an exclusion zone, or 
starting a fire on-board the vessel), while others exploit the gap in the 
defense and rush in to their objective. 
2.  Threat as Modeled in MANA 
Two distinct squads were created in MANA to represent the saturated attack and 
diversionary tactic. The attack route the squads take are shown in the maps in Figure 12 
for LA and in Figure 13 for HK. For the MANA scenarios with the diversionary attack, 
the decoy takes the route as indicated on the maps in an attempt to lure the defenders 
away before the actual attackers begin their attack. The speeds of the attackers are fixed 
























Figure 12.   Scenario Setup for LA, Showing Defended Asset and Attackers’ Route 












Figure 13.   Scenario Setup for HK, Showing Defended Asset and Attackers’ Route 
(Google Earth, after Microsoft Word) 
C. DEFENDER CONOPS 
1.  Possible Defender Response Tactics 
There are three possible defensive postures considered in this study: 
1. Scramble from Base: A patrol boat is scrambled from a base at shore 
near the defended asset to intercept the intruder. It is assumed (as was in 
Abdul-Ghaffar’s study) that there is only one defended asset. A downside 
is that there will be a time-lag for the operators to start the engines and get 
to the intercept point.  
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2. Barrier Patrol: A standard barrier patrol is assigned a stretch of water to 
patrol, and acts to deter and detect intruders. The barrier can be positioned 
across the mouth of a channel perpendicular to the axis of the anticipated 
attack. The advantage of this mode of deployment compared to scrambling 
from base is that the patrol boats’ engines are already hot and ready to 
give chase to any intruder, but the downside to the barrier patrol is that the 
patrol boat may take time to turn and join the chase, and a predictable 
patrol route can be easily observed by the attacker. The attacker will have 
opportunity to observe and wait for the patrol boat to pass before making 
an attempt to break through the barrier, giving the defender a slight 
disadvantage due to its orientation. 
3. Random Patrol: A patrol boat is assigned responsibility for a given 
sector. The patrol can randomly choose to approach passing ships in a 
channel, or go closer to shore to inspect facilities, or stay within the 
channel like a barrier patrol. This randomness reduces the predictability of 
the patrol boat’s location, hopefully making it more difficult for the 
attacker to seize an opportunity to strike when the patrol boat is in a 
disadvantaged position. 
 
A MANA squad is created for each of the defender tactics, with their deployments 
and patrol routes shown in Figures 14 and 15 for the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of 
Hong Kong respectively. The patrol boats at these deployment positions satisfy the 
condition of having line of sight to the attackers’ axes of approach, yielding a 100% 






















Figure 14.   Scenario Setup for LA, Showing Defenders’ Deployment and Patrol Routes 











Figure 15.   Scenario Setup for HK, Showing Defenders’ Deployment and Patrol Routes 
(After Google Earth) 
2.  Rules of Engagement 
The interception engagement can be broken down into three stages:  
i) Determine intent of the vessel: Once the patrol boat has been alerted, it 
will vector toward the intruder to interdict and hail the approaching vessel, 
with the objective to warn the vessel that it has infringed upon the 
exclusion zone. 
ii) Deter the vessel: If the intruding vessel, after having been warned, 
continues its course, it will be taken that it has malicious intent and 
attempts will be made to deter the crew from their current path with non-
lethal weapons (if the patrol boat is equipped). 
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iii) Stop the vessel: Should the non-lethal weapons fail to turn the vessel 
back, effort must be made to stop the intruder. This could be achieved 
either by the patrol boats’ gunnery or by ramming the intruder. 
In the simulation model, however, only a real threat intrudes (there are no false 
alarms) so the patrol boat always seeks to stop the intruding vessel and only step (iii) is 
modeled. 
3. Kinematic Analysis of Interception 
The interception of small boats bears close resemblance to the interception of 
aircraft attacking a ship (Naval Operations Analysis, 1999). In order to conduct a 
successful intercept, the patrol boat must close in on the attacker boat to within weapon 
engagement range. The geometry of the engagement is shown in Figure 16, with 
successful interceptions occurring for combinations of Closest Point of Approach (CPA) 
and Range at Detection (RDet) for which θA has valid solutions. This equation was used to 



























Figure 16.   Geometry of Interception Engagement 
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D.  FACTORS AND LEVELS  
The scope of this study is to compare the robustness of alternative defensive 
deployments against variations in the attackers’ tactics, focusing on the key factors of 
current security strategy policies and current platforms. The controllable and noise (non-
controllable) factors that are involved in the real scenario, whether they were considered 
in this study, and the levels that were studied, are given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is possible for future research on 
variables that were fixed in this study to quantify their effect on interception operations. 
Alternative defender and attacker platforms could be contrasted, or the effect of shipping 
density analyzed. High shipping density in a channel would greatly restrict the maneuver 
space for a patrol boat attempting the interception of a speedboat that is weaving its way 
between slower cargo ships, reducing the effectiveness of the defense. Simulation could 
also be used to analyze the variation of sensor performances, environmental conditions, 
or operator skill levels. 
 
Controllable Factors Fixed / Variable Levels 
Security Policy Fixed Coastal surveillance with controlled navigation 
Tactics Variable 3 levels: Static, Barrier patrol, Random Patrol 
Platform Fixed SAFE Defender class patrol boat 
Number Variable 1 to 4 
Speed Fixed 45 knots 
Defender 
Weapons Fixed 12.7 mm (0.5 in) gun 




Non-controllable Factors Fixed / Variable Levels 
Weather Fixed Fair weather 








Tactics Variable 2 levels: Saturation and Diversionary 
Platform Fixed Baja Outlaw 20’ speedboat 
Number Variable Saturation: 1 to 4 
Diversionary: 1 decoy and 1 to 3 actual attackers 
Attacker 
Speed Fixed  54 knots 
Table 2.   Non-controllable Analysis Factors 
E.  DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
The first experiment uses the deployment positions as recommended by Abdul-
Ghaffar’s study, but with the probability of at least one attacker reaching the defended 
asset instead of the probability of detection as the MOE. The number of attackers was 
varied between one to four, as was the number of defenders, for a total of 16 design 
points, with 100 simulation replications per design point for this baseline case. 
Subsequent experiments were performed to compare the effectiveness of the three 
defender tactics against the two attacker tactics. In view of the relatively small number of 
factor levels, a full factorial experimental design (see Table 3) was chosen to survey the 
entire parameter space for the two factors of attacker and defender tactics, with their 
respective number of platforms, for a total of 84 design points, with 100 replications for 









MOE 2: Number of Attackers Killed  Saturation Diversionary 
  Number of Attackers Number of Attackers 
  
Num of 
Defenders 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
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2               
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. BASELINE SCENARIO (LA) 
1. Defense Against One Attacker 
The results of the baseline scenario replicating Abdul-Ghaffar’s recommended 
patrol boat deployment positions are presented in Figure 17.  The vertical axis shows the 
response variable “Red_Success,” an indicator variable where 1 indicates at least one 
attacker evaded and outran the defenders and made it to their target, while 0 indicates all 
attackers were stopped by the defenders. Values between 0 and 1 indicate the proportion 
of the 100 replications in which at least one attacker reaches its goal. The top horizontal 
axis breaks the chart into four columns, such that the left-most column shows the 
performance of one to four defenders against one attacker. Columns two to four show the 
performance against two to four attackers, respectively. When there is one defender 
against one attacker, a Red_Success rate of 5% shows that interdiction is successful 95% 
of the time, improving to 100% when there is more than one defender. (Note that for 100 
replications, the standard error associated with these empirical findings is 10√(pq) ≤ 5, 




Figure 17.    Probability of Attacker Success, Grouped by Number of Attackers 
Based on the kinematic analysis provided in Chapter III, the geometry between 
the attacker and defender in the given deployment position should be able to guarantee an 
interdiction all the time. However, in the 5% of simulation runs where the attacker 
manages to reach its intended target, the defender is unable to intercept the attacker. This 
is partially due to the limitation of MANA agents in thinking ahead to intelligently plan 
and move on an intercept course.  
Acknowledging this as a limitation in modeling the engagement, the real world 
equivalent of engagements between two moving boats is also fraught with uncertainties. 
Firstly, in practice, the defender may not know for certain the attacker’s goal to be able to 
anticipate the heading. In addition, when the defender approaches sufficiently close to 
fire upon the attacker, there is no guarantee a gun round will be able to hit the attacker 
due to the motion of the boat going over the waves, who is also in a moving boat on the 
waves. With the instability of the firing platform, it is very possible that bullets can hit 
the attacker’s boat but not injure the attacker, or miss the boat altogether. Moreover, at 
high speeds of 40 knots, distances close very fast and the defender may overshoot the 
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attacker, who is also attempting to evade the defender by maneuvering, ending up in a 
tail-chase with the attacker being able to outrun the defender. These factors will result in 
a failed interception, even though the defender may be able to approach sufficiently close 
to the attacker.  
Given the complexity and uncertainty of the engagement in the real world, it is 
highly probable that the results shown in this analysis are overly optimistic. Nevertheless, 
the model serves as a common yardstick to gauge the effectiveness of the defender in 
each scenario and perform a comparative analysis between the tactics, and draw insights 
into the issues concerning defense against small boat attacks. 
2. Defense Against Two Attackers 
In the second column of Figure 17, a dramatic drop in the defender’s effectiveness 
is observed when there are now two attackers. If there is only one defender, only one 
attacker will typically be interdicted, and the other will successfully reach the intended 
target, explaining the 100% Red_Success rate. The defender is outnumbered and is only 
able to focus the interception effort on one attacker. When there are two defenders, the 
attackers succeed 69% of the time, with only 31% chance that both the attackers will be 
stopped. More defenders perform better, reducing the proportion of attacker success to 
44% with three defenders, and 40% with four defenders.  
The number of attackers intercepted in an engagement is shown on the left 
vertical axis of Figure 18. The grouping by number of attackers on the top horizontal axis 
breaks the chart into four columns, with the left-most column showing the performance 
of one to four defenders against one attacker. The right axis splits the chart into two rows, 
with the top row showing the number of attackers intercepted for runs where 
Red_Success is 0, while the bottom half shows the average number of attackers 





Figure 18.   Number of Attackers Intercepted, Grouped by Number of Attackers and 
Red_Success 
When two defenders and two attackers engage (results reflected in the bottom row 
of the second column of Figure 18), often times only one attacker is intercepted leading 
to the attackers’ high probability of success of 69%. A more concerning result is that 
when four defenders engage two attackers, there is still a high chance that only one 
attacker is intercepted and the other attacker is able to evade and conduct a successful 
attack. 
This result reflects the situation in a real engagement when two defenders give 
chase to a single attacker, in the hope of applying numerical superiority to obtain a higher 
chance of stopping the attacker. Since both defenders focus on one attacker, the other 
attacker manages to slip past and score its’ objective. It is also conceivable that due to the 
fast-paced chase, there would be confusion regarding which attacker each patrol boat is to 
focus on. This modeling limitation may be less evident in practice, if good command and 
control is able to reduce the confusion. 
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The inability to completely prevent an attack when there are just two attackers is a 
cause for concern, especially when the defender has the numerical advantage (three or 
four defenders, see bottom row of second column of Figure 18). It is often thought that 
the side with a numerical advantage has the higher odds of winning, but due to the 
difficulties of the engagement of a fast-moving target on the seas and high speeds, 
complicated by the confusion during the engagement, there is opportunity for the attacker 
to break through the defenses and commit a successful attack, nullifying any numerical 
advantage the defender may have. 
3. Defense Against Three and Four Attackers 
The defenders have a hard time defending against three simultaneous attacks, 
mustering an interdiction rate of only 7% with three defenders and 16% with four 
defenders (see the third column in Figure 17). When there are four attackers (see the 
fourth column of Figure 17), it is almost impossible to stop all the attackers. The results 
underscore the difficulties in the engagement due to the unstable firing platform, 
maneuvering opponents and confusion during the interception mentioned above. The 
results also highlight a further weakness that can be exploited by the attacker—that 
having more attackers will distribute the attention of the defenders, elevating the chance 
of at least one attacker breaking through successfully. This effect will be seen more 
clearly in the diversionary attack tactic, and further discussed. 
B. SATURATION ATTACK AGAINST THE PORT OF LA 
1.  Scramble Tactic Effectiveness   
When the defenders scramble from shore to intercept an incoming threat, if there 
is one attacker or four attackers, the attack is fended off equally well as the stationary 
position recommended by Abdul-Ghaffar (see columns one and four in Figure 19). The 
scramble from shore tactic, however, produces a higher proportion of success when there 






Figure 19.   Effectiveness of Scramble Tactic Against a Saturation Attack (LA) 
There is an advantage in scrambling patrol boats from shore to intercept an 
inbound intruder, since the intruder will be headed straight to where the defenders are, 
giving rise to a head-on engagement. This can be a better situation than when the patrol 
boat attempts an intercept that may end up as a tail-chase. Admittedly, the advantage may 
be limited to the specific engagement geometry between the patrol boats and the attackers 
considered in the scenario setup. However, the same engagement limitations of shooting 
a moving boat from a moving boat still exist, and the consequences of a head-to-head 
collision would be disastrous and lead to the damage or capsizing of either the defender 
or attacker. Such a collision led to the deaths of two officers in Singapore in 2007 
(Wikipedia, List of Singapore police officers killed in the line of duty) when a Singapore 
Police Coast Guard interceptor craft collided with a smuggler’s speedboat, resulting in 
both boats capsizing and trapping the officers within. 
2.  Barrier Patrol Effectiveness 
A barrier patrol performs worse than the tactic of scrambling from shore. In a 
one-on-one engagement, the attacker has a 30% success rate in getting through, and more 
than 70% chance of a successful attack if there are two or more attackers (Figure 20). A 
reason for the poorer performance is due to the engagement geometry, i.e., the barrier 








Figure 20.   Effectiveness of Barrier Patrol Against a Saturation Attack (LA) 
A real world engagement may be even worse than these results—given the fact 
that the attacker would be able to observe the position of the patrol boat, and wait for it to 
travel a distance away before commencing their attack, which will result in a tail chase 
that disadvantages the defender, who is responding from afar. 
3.  Random Patrol Effectiveness 
Adding random elements to break the predictability of a barrier patrol does not 
improve the ability of the defender to stop the attackers in the model. A one-on-one 
engagement from a random patrol (the left column in Figure 21) fares slightly worse than 
the regular barrier patrol, letting an attacker through 40% of the time. Against two or 
more attackers, the results are similar to the barrier patrol. The random patrol has the 
same weakness that attackers can exploit, namely biding their time until the patrol has 
passed, despite the randomness of patrol route. All the attacker has to do is to observe one 
instance of the patrol boat passing by, wait for a few minutes, and execute the attack at 







Figure 21.   Effectiveness of Random Patrol Against a Saturation Attack (LA) 
C. SATURATION ATTACK AGAINST THE PORT OF HK 
1.  Scramble Tactic Effectiveness 
For a one-on-one engagement, the results are consistent with that seen for the Port 
of Los Angeles, with only 5% of attacks succeeding (Figure 22). When there are two 
attackers, two defenders are able to stop both attackers 80% of the time for Hong Kong, 
compared to 50% in Los Angeles. Three defenders are able to reduce three attackers’ 







Figure 22.   Effectiveness of Scramble Tactic Against a Saturation Attack (HK) 
These results show the same complement of defenders can defend Hong Kong 
slightly better than Los Angeles. Upon closer analysis, the attackers in LA are 
constrained to a smaller axis of attack. The defenders are drawn toward the attackers, and 
when there is more than one attacker, an attacker will be able to break through the 
defender’s lines in the melee, and succeed to strike the target. In the HK scenario, there 
are more axes for the attackers to spread out, giving opportunity for the defenders to 
break off from one engagement and intercept the attacker approaching along another axis. 
This finding, coupled with the previous observation that the defenders’ numerical 
advantage can be nullified in a saturation attack, hints that a simultaneous concentrated 
single axis attack could be more lethal than if the attackers spread themselves out. 
2. Barrier and Random Patrol Effectiveness 
The barrier patrol performs worse than scrambling from base (see Figure 23), 
consistent with what was observed in LA, since the attackers can wait for the patrol to 
pass and exploit the engagement geometry to their advantage. The defenders on barrier 
patrol in HK now perform worse than their counterparts in LA, due to the longer patrol 
route, favoring the attacker. A similar situation is observed for the random patrol in HK 











Figure 24.   Random Barrier Against a Saturation Attack (HK) 
D. DIVERSIONARY ATTACK IN THE PORT OF LA 
1. Effectiveness of Response from Static Positions  
A diversionary attack is extremely effective in the Port of Los Angeles. None of 
the defender tactics managed to stop any attack, leading to the dismal results shown in 
Figure 25. With just one attacker (and the decoy), the terrorists are able to reach their 
target unopposed. Once the defenders have been drawn away by the decoy, the attackers 
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are able to close the short distance between the traffic lane (where the attackers start) and 
the target, leaving the defenders no chance of returning to intercept the new intruders. 
In the model, all the available defenders were automatically tasked to intercept the 
decoy, which may make sense if the intruder were a real attacker, since having more 
interceptors would raise the chances of a successful intercept. In reality it would be 
possible to be flexible and keep some patrol boats at their current station while sending 
one or two to intercept the intruder. The results of this study are a cautionary tale on the 
possibility that the terrorists could use deception to achieve their goals, and the disastrous 
result if the defender is not ready for such a situation. 
E. DIVERSIONARY ATTACK IN THE PORT OF HK 
The results show the defenders are equally inept at protecting the Port of Hong 
Kong as the Port of Los Angeles, with the attackers succeeding nearly 100% of the time 
(see Figure 26). There is, however, one surprising finding. The tactic of scrambling from 
shore against three attackers, and patrolling defenders against two or three attackers, 
stand a chance of intercepting the attackers.  
Due to the distance between the traffic lane and the attacker’s goal, the defenders 
that were already responding to the decoy are able to see and respond to the newer 
(authentic) attacker some of the time. This explains the slight trend that as the number of 
attackers and defenders increase, the more likely a successful interception can take place 
(third column of Figure 26). Unfortunately, there are more attackers than those 
intercepted, and the attack is still successful since at least one attacker made it past the 
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Number of Defenders (Random) Number of Defenders (Random)  
Figure 26.   Highly Successful Diversionary Attacks (HK) 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS  
1. Attacker Tactics 
Across the scenarios examined, a diversionary attack is the most effective tactic 
the attacker can use, promising a near 100% chance of the attack succeeding. It takes just 
one accomplice boat diverting the defender’s attention, while the real attacker boat slips 
through the compromised defenses and delivers a nasty blow. This highlights a potential 
weakness in the defender’s rules of engagement that the attacker can exploit, and could 
be mitigated by a refinement of tactics for the contingency of a deception attack, by 
ensuring that not all defender assets are assigned to intercept the first intruder, but to 
retain defensive assets for potential follow-on attacks. 
The alternative tactic, the saturation attack, utilizing two attack boats against two 
defenders, or three boats against three or more defenders, proves difficult to defend 
against, having attack success rates exceeding 50%. This is primarily due to the effect of 
inaccuracies in shooting while moving and confusion at high speeds during the 
engagement, and it is a worrisome finding that shows the defender’s numerical advantage 
can be nullified in a deliberate attack with two or more boat attacks simultaneously on a 
single axis. 
2.  Defender Tactics 
All the defender tactics considered are glaringly susceptible to deception by a 
diversionary attack; however, there are some differences between the defender tactics 
against a saturation attack. Scrambling patrol boats from shore seems to be the most 
effective against a saturated attack, and has advantages over the barrier and random 
patrols due to the fact that the attacker will have to close in toward the defender in order 
to reach the asset being defended, bringing the attacker to the defender. A caveat is that 
this advantage may only be valid for defended assets that are confined in a small location 
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(less than 1 NM in the scenarios considered in this study), and there may not be an 
advantage if the assets stretch over a long coastline since the defender would not be able 
to guess exactly which point along the coast the attackers are heading for. Further 
exploration on tactics to defend a long coastline of assets could be worthwhile—for 
example, can a barrier patrol’s effectiveness be increased if the patrol route were closer to 
shore than to the shipping lane in order to improve the intercept geometry? 
3. Broader Operational Issues 
This study has shown that having sufficient reaction time and being able to 
anticipate the attackers’ direction of movement are key factors to a successful 
engagement. The security policies that are in place to control traffic and restrict approach 
routes are critical as a first filter to deduce the intent of the attacker. However, a major 
assumption was made concerning the actual engagement; that is an engagement can 
succeed so long as the patrol boat is sufficiently near to the attacker. Throughout the 
discussion, several crucial factors hindering a successful engagement were highlighted, 
such as the inaccurate firing of weapons due to the instability of the moving boats and the 
high-speed nature of the engagement leading to a tail-chase situation, which means that 
there is no guarantee of successful engagement when a patrol boat gets close to the 
attacker. Hence, the results presented in this study are optimistic, and boat-to-boat 
engagements taking place in reality would be expected to perform much worse. 
There are further pressing operational questions that arise from these observations 
regarding actual existing engagement capabilities and CONOPS: how would a fully laden 
speedboat at full speed be stopped by a similar-sized patrol boat? A small, agile patrol 
boat may be able to give chase and catch up with the attacker, but could easily overturn in 
a collision or carry insufficient weaponry to stop the attacker. Conversely, a heavy patrol 
boat would be more survivable in the event of a collision and can carry more weapons, 
but would it be agile enough to maneuver and close in on the attacker? These questions 
beg additional research for insight. 
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B. COMPARISON OF TOOLS 
Abdul-Ghaffar’s prior research, which catalyzed this study, showed the 
application of modeling as a prescriptive tool, prescribing the deployment of patrol boats 
to ensure optimal detection of the threat. This study expands on prior research and 
illustrates the use of modeling and simulation as a facilitative tool for analysis, gaining 
insight by comparing various tactics and showing the utility of analyzing the robustness 
of a solution in the interception of the threat.  
The solutions prescribed by Abdul-Ghaffar’s analysis that promised 100% 
detection were not necessarily optimal when the MOE was changed to interdiction. There 
are alternative deployment tactics that were found to be essentially as good at detecting 
the threat, but better at interception of the threat. This finding agrees with Abdul-
Ghaffar’s conclusion of the further need to solve for patrol locations after his first step of 
analyzing the detection capability of patrol boats, and reinforces the importance of 
considering the effectiveness of both detection and interception for best tactic selection in 
patrol boat operations against the small boat attack threat. 
The procedure to develop a realistic simulation involves a comprehensive survey 
of the factors and interactions in a scenario. This process, combined with the 
interpretation of the simulation results and, especially, with experienced personnel, can 
spotlight key uncertainties or assumptions about real world operating scenarios. In this 
study, the true capability of the patrol boats in engaging moving boats and the uncertainty 
of knowing the attacker’s true target (if the defended assets are spread over a large area) 
were two key issues that were brought into focus. 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research on the following areas could yield additional interesting insights 
relevant to the defense against small boat attacks: 
 Compare the effectiveness of a mix of deployment tactics, 
 Study the effectiveness of defense when defended assets are spread out 
over a longer coastline, 
 Analyze alternative platforms and weapons, in particular, it would be 
possible to data-farm the parameters held constant or not considered in 
this study to suggest possible platform-weapon systems for effective threat 
mitigation, 
 Analyze the effect of shipping density on defending against small boat 
attacks, 
 More closely study the means to determine threat intent, and their effects 
on the concepts of operations for defending assets, 
 Include shore-based assets (e.g. sensors) into the analysis, and 
 Study factors and tactics to defend moving (passenger) ships from small 
boat attacks. 
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